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MONSTERS AT THE PATENT OFFICE: THE
INCONSISTENT CONCLUSIONS OF MORAL
UTILITY AND THE CONTROVERSY
OF HUMAN CLONING
INTRODUCrION
There are monsters loose in the United States patent system.
Human clones, part-man, part-beast creations, and gentle-sounding,
but bizarre inventions that "encompass a human" are wreaking havoc
in the halls of Congress and at the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office. But are these man-made creatures truly a "parade of
horribles"' as the United States Supreme Court once put it-the inev-
itable slippery slope of the United States' extraordinary advances in
the biotech industry? Or do they represent something totally benign
that, given the goals of our patent system, will "silently sink into con-
tempt and disregard ' 2 as a forgotten baby step toward something
enormously valuable to science? The issues confronting this clash of
law and science may have colossal implications not only on one of the
American economy's fastest growing sectors, but perhaps on our defi-
nition of what is or is not human and what constitutes life itself.3
Some authors suggest that patenting such technologies will lead to the
commodification of humans and envision an Aldous Huxley-esque
1. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980). The Court noted that the petitioner's
amicus briefs pointed to the potential for "grave risks" that may be associated with further ex-
ploration of genetic manipulation. Id. In validating a patent directed to the product of a genetic
manipulation process, the Court dismissed the concerns that suggested that "genetic research
may pose a serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers are far too
substantial to permit such research to proceed apace at this time .... " Id. The Court also stated
that:
We are told that genetic research and related technological developments may spread
pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its prac-
tice may tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are forcefully,
even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity seems
unable to control fully the forces it creates-that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better
"to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of."
Id.
2. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
3. See Dashka Slater, huMouse, 1 LEGAL AFF. 20, 28 (2002) (noting that, should the cloning
debate regarding patents reach the Supreme Court, and the justices take up the ontological is-
sues passed up in Chakrabarty, "the Court presumably would have to face the question that has
puzzled the patent office for decades and philosophers for eons: What makes us human? Are we
human because of what we do and what we are capable of, or because of something written in
our DNA?"); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice
and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247 (2000).
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"brave new world" where humanity is given a dollar value and parents
may choose their children's traits as if selecting a meal from a buffet.4
Others see cloning and associated technologies as the destiny of medi-
cal science that could lead to the complete eradication of all human
ills. 5
Progress, however, does not come without a price, and an issued
patent allowing the legal right to exclude others from valuable tech-
niques resulting from costly research is nearly essential to industrial
and economic success.6 As the biotech industry applies more of its
technology to curing human ills, the issued patents claiming the prod-
ucts of these techniques come closer to granting an exclusive, though
limited, property right in a human being.7 To contend with the tre-
mendous ethical issues challenging traditional legal notions within the
patent system, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) resurrected a monster of its own: moral utility. The concept
comes from an 1817 decision defining a patentable invention as one
4. See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); Ruth Hubbard & Stuart
Newman, Yuppie Eugenics, Council for Responsible Genetics, available at http://www.zmag.org/
ZMag/articles/march02hubbard-newman.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). The Hubbard and New-
man article noted .that recent advances in marketing human genetic manipulation lead to the
conclusion that:
[W]e have entered the era of Yuppie Eugenics. A contemporary, ostensibly voluntary
form of older ideas and practices, Yuppie Eugenics is based in modern molecular genet-
ics and concepts of "choice," and has begun to raise the high tech prospect of employ-
ing prenatal genetic engineering. What it shares with the earlier doctrines is the goal of
improving and perfecting human bloodlines and the human species as a whole.
Id.
5. See generally Human Cloning: Must We Sacrifice Medical Research in the Name of a Total
Ban?: Hearing on S. 1899 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 20-25 (2002) (state-
ment of Dr. Irving L. Weissman, Chair, Panel on Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human
Cloning, The National Academy of Sciences, and Professor, Stanford University School of
Medicine), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). Dr.
Weissman stated that:
Scientists place high value on the freedom of inquiry-a freedom that underlies all
forms of scientific and medical research. Recommending restriction of research is a
serious matter, and the reasons for such a restriction must be compelling. In the case of
human reproductive cloning, we are convinced that the potential dangers to the im-
planted fetus, to the newborn, and to the woman carrying the fetus constitute just such
compelling reasons. In contrast, there are no scientific or medical reasons to ban nu-
clear transplantation to produce stem cells, and such a ban would certainly close ave-
nues of promising scientific and medical research.
Id.
6. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
7. Any patent claiming the product of human genetic manipulation would confer on the
owner the limited right to exclude others from using or practicing that invention. See generally
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 48 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that the rights conferred by a patent are limited to "the
right to exclude and nothing else").
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that was, among other things, not "injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society."8 Courts have applied moral utility
inconsistently and sporadically at best,9 and a recent decision might
have severely weakened the ability of the USPTO to apply the con-
cept to deny patents directed to humans. 10
In 1999, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in Juicy Whip v.
Orange Bang1 that a district court erred when it invalidated Juicy
Whip's patent entitled "Post-Mix Beverage Dispenser With an Associ-
ated Simulated Display of Beverage."' 12 In reversing the decision, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the lower court erred in
holding that Juicy Whip's patent was invalid for lack of utility "on the
ground that the patented invention was designed to deceive customers
by imitating another product and thereby increasing sales of the par-
ticular good."' 13 The court reasoned that the doctrine of moral or ben-
eficial utility-that inventions "injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society" are unpatentable-"has not been
applied broadly in recent years."' 14 The court's reversal, however, did
not go so far as to refuse to ever uphold the reasoning. Rather, the
court left some room for the idea that moral utility might have some
further application to modern patent law and held only that inven-
tions cannot "be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because
they have the capacity to fool some members of the public. 15
But exactly how far is the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals willing
to take the idea of moral utility? The Juicy Whip holding severely
limits the doctrine as applied to mechanical devices. 16 However, the
court's refusal to invalidate the idea of moral utility altogether might
signal that the doctrine could be applied in other circumstances, or
perhaps, in other patentable subject areas.
The debate surrounding the process of human cloning provides fer-
tile ground for the court to sow moral utility into modern patent law.
However, in light of Juicy Whip and the reluctance of most scholars
and courts to accept morality as a condition within the American pat-
ent system, application of moral utility might not provide the most
8. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). See also infra note 23 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 107-128 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
11. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
12. Id. at 1365.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1366-67.
15. Id. at 1368.
16. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
2003]
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reliable legal reasoning for rejecting patents directed to the processes
and products of human genetic manipulation. 17 Regardless of any
misgivings about construing morality in patent law and, in the absence
of congressional guidance to the contrary, the courts and the USPTO
may find moral utility as the only tenable reasoning for rejecting these
patents. This Comment will examine the development of the moral
utility doctrine and evaluate the feasibility of its modern application in
the United States patent system to some highly controversial aspects
of biotechnology.
Part II will trace the development of the moral utility doctrine and
its past applications."' Part III will discuss the current state of moral
utility in light of Juicy Whip and examine the USPTO's reluctance to
apply the doctrine as well as legislative efforts to come to terms with
controversial technology. 19 Part IV will look at the possibility of ap-
plying moral utility within the United States patent system and the
potential complications it might cause.20
II. BACKGROUND
There is no explicit statutory basis for the moral utility require-
ment.21 Applications of the doctrine necessarily depend on judicial
and administrative interpretations of the Patent Act and relevant pre-
cedent. This section first describes the various sources that combine
to create moral utility, and second provides some insight into the rele-
vance of the doctrine to the modern cloning debate.
A. Moral Utility: The Constitution, the USPTO, and the
Federal Courts
There are three major bases for the concept of patentable utility:
the Constitution, the administrative interpretation of the Patent Act
and federal court precedent through USPTO registration, and opin-
ions of the federal courts. Each source contributes a piece the to the
moral utility puzzle: the Constitution provides the basis for the patent
system by protecting the useful arts;22 the USPTO evaluates patent
applications based on numerous criteria, including, in some instances,
moral utility;23 and the federal courts adjudicate claims of patent va-
17. See infra notes 102-139 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 21-173 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 175-243 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 240-242 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 24-29, 56-59 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
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lidity based, in part, on an invention's utility.24 This section explores
the origin of the doctrine and describes its evolution and incorpora-
tion into modern practice under the 1952 Patent Act. Furthermore,
this section illuminates the tension created by Juicy Whip's weakening
of moral utility despite the principle's continued recognition by both
scholars and the USPTO.
1. The Historical Perspective of Moral Utility
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution holds the au-
thority for the United States patent system and the basis for the utility
requirement itself.25 The simple clause "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries" is the starting point for all United States patent law.26 Thomas
Jefferson's belief that "ingenuity should receive liberal encourage-
ment" was the cornerstone for the constitutional provision and the
first Patent Act.2 7 Today, it still serves as the primary objective of the
United States patent system. 28 Authored by Jefferson in 1790, the first
United States Patent Act authorized patents for "any new and useful
art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. ' 29 By its emphasis on protection of only that
which was new and useful, Jefferson's Act provided the first glimpse
of the importance of utility. By the Constitutional mandate allowing
Congress to "[p]romote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts"
and since the first Patent Act, no patent may be granted unless the
invention it describes is useful.30
24. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966) (stating that "the concept of utility has main-
tained a central place in all our patent legislation, beginning with the first patent law in 1790 and
culminating in the present ... provision.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Id.
27. 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed., 1871).
28. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (stating that Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 of the Constitution was "both a grant of power and a limitation.") The Court also stated, "This
qualified authority . . . is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts . . . .' The
Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the
stated constitutional purpose." Id.
29. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. This law replaced the first Patent Act of 1790 and
more clearly defined the scope of the grant. Although providing a first step, the statute did not
begin to resemble the modern patent system until its revision in 1836. Then, a formal system of
examination, with professional examiners, was enacted to bolster patent protection. Id.
30. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. cl. 8.
20031
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However, the meaning of the term "useful" within the context of
the 1790 law was never defined by Congress. 31 In 1817, Justice Joseph
Story enunciated the first interpretation of the term "useful" within
the 1790 Act. 32 In an infringement action that contested the validity
of a patent granted to the inventor of a type of pump, Justice Story
rejected the argument that the plaintiff must show that his invention
was "for the public, a better pump than the common pump" to be
"new and useful" according to the 1790 Act.33 Justice Story's formula-
tion of utility under the statute required that the invention be socially
beneficial, that:
[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivo-
lous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of
society. The word "useful," therefore, is incorporated into the act in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facili-
tate private assassination, is not a patentable invention. But if the
invention steers wide of these objections, whether it be more or less
usefull [sic] is a circumstance very material to the interests of the
patentee, but of no importance to the public. If it be not extensively
useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard. 34
Justice Story's definition of patentable utility as not "frivolous or inju-
rious" and as the opposite of "mischievous or immoral" was the first
recognition of a beneficial or moral component to patents.35 Nearly
all future applications of the moral utility doctrine would cite his
formulation.36
Early decisions invalidating patents for lack of moral utility based
on Justice Story's standard focused on the fact that the invention facil-
itated illegal or immoral acts. 37 The highest concentration of rejec-
tions based on moral utility concerned gambling devices. 38
Application of Justice Story's formulation led judges early on to reject
patents on devices that could only be used for the immoral act of gam-
31. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1. The law merely sets forth the basic requirements for patentabil-
ity, that "any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" is
eligible. Id. at 319.
32. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
36. See generally Nat'l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Il. 1889);
Cusano v. Kotler, 159 F.2d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 1947); In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-79 (C.C.P.A.
1960); Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366; and most recently Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline,
213 F. Supp. 2d 597 (E.D. Vir. 2002).
37. See generally Nat'l Automatic Device Co., 40 F. at 90; Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448, 449
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897).
38. See cases cited supra note 37.
[Vol. 53:159
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bling.39 For example, in National Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd,40 the
court held that the patent for a "Toy Automatic Race-Course" com-
monly employed in bars and used only as a gambling device was un-
patentable because "it [was] not a useful device, within the meaning of
the patent law, as its use so far has been only pernicious and hurt-
ful."''a  However, early application of the doctrine led to abuse as
several courts invalidated patents that had potentially significant uses
outside their primary uses in gambling. 42
As courts and scholars tried to clarify the limits of utility, the focus
began to shift from morality to the idea that the invention must confer
some benefit on the public. 43 An illegal or immoral utility for an in-
vention was described as the absence of public benefit and "destitute
of true utility."' 44 Even where the invention's product was socially
beneficial, if the net result of the invention's use was detrimental to
society, it lacked patentable utility.45 One opinion written at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century hinted at the course the courts would
39. Id.
40. 40 F. 89.
41. Id. at 90.
42. Schultze, 82 F. at 449 (holding a patent for a coin-operated device invalid where the inven-
tor's claimed utility was "the telling of a fortune, which may be effected by means of a prepared
list of statements" by the conclusory declaration that "[tihere is certainly no utility apparent in
this device").
43. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 338 (1890) (recog-
nizing that "[i]n order that an invention may be patentable it must not only be bestowed upon
the public by its inventor, but when bestowed it must confer on them a benefit").
44. Id. § 340. Robinson stated that:
Inventions which accomplish definite practical results may nevertheless possess such
attributes as destroy the benefits that otherwise they would bestow upon the public.
Inventions whose chief or only value resides in the facilities which they afford to men to
perpetuate some wrongful injury either by fraud or violence against each other are thus
regarded as destitute of true utility.
Id.
45. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. 287, 396-97 (1873). The Court held that an erratic or danger-
ous invention was invalid for lack of utility because:
[Elven where the means described will accomplish the described result,... it cannot be
held that the invention is useful if it appears that the operator, [sic] in using the de-
scribed means, is constantly exposed to imminent danger, either from the explosive
tendency of the substance to be used or from the liability of the vessel to burst which is
required to be employed as means of accomplishing the patented result. Where the
patentee finds it necessary to employ any such dangerous means to accomplish the
described end it cannot be held that his invention is useful, within the meaning of the
patent law, even though it appears that the operator, when no such disaster happens,
may be able to work out the described result by the described means, as it is quite clear
that Congress, in making provision to secure to inventors the exclusive right to their
discoveries, never intended to promote any such as were in their nature constantly dan-
gerous to the operator in employing the described means to accomplish the described
result.
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eventually take regarding the proper role for morality within patenta-
ble utility.46 In Fuller v. Berger, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit formulated a test for patentable utility that
stated "everything [is] useful within the meaning of the law, if it is
used (or is designed and adapted to be used) to accomplish a good
result, though in fact it is oftener used.., to accomplish a bad one. '47
Furthermore, even if only the present uses for the invention were ille-
gal or immoral, if "the court itself should see, or be convinced by ex-
perts" that there were acceptable uses for the device, then its utility
should be upheld. 48
The Fuller court stated that the proper gauge of utility should be
any measure of benefit conferred upon society and that judges, de-
spite personal reservations about the morality of an invention's use,
were not the proper arbiters of such a standard.49 In upholding the
patent for an invention that detected bogus coins in gambling ma-
chines, the court concluded that:
It is obvious that a denial of the [patent] would leave the defendants
and others perfectly free, so far as the power of this court is con-
cerned, to follow the practices that are repugnant to the individual
chancellors, while the maintenance of the complainant's right to ex-
clude the defendants and all others would, to the extent that the
patented device might otherwise be used by them to promote gam-
bling, be a vindication of the public sentiment against gambling. It
is equally obvious that, however the court may act upon complain-
ant's asserted right to exclude, neither the grant nor the denial of the
writ of injunction would operate upon complainant's practices or
habits (which he did not acquire from the patent laws), and that the
gambler, like the drunkard, is amenable to the municipal authorities
alone for violations of the municipal law. 50
Later Seventh Circuit rulings considering the patentable utility of
gambling devices based their conclusions on findings of any legal use
for the device and regularly misapplied the distinction between legal-
ity and patentable utility described in Fuller.51 Following Fuller, if the
46. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903).
47. Id. at 275.
48. Id. at 276.
49. Id. (stating that a measure of utility that balances an invention's good functions against its
bad functions "cannot stand, because if it could, it would make the validity of the patents depend
on a question of fact to which it would often be impossible to give a reliable answer").
50. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). The dissent, however, pointed out that gambling was illegal
in all but one state and that, because the invention had gambling as its principal purpose, the
patent was, in effect, condoning illegality. Id. at 279-81 (Grosscup, J., dissenting).
51. Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512, 513 (7th Cir. 1922) (refusing to find utility in a vending
device or a punch board because "[n]o other utility than as a lottery device ... [was] suggested in
the patent .... "); Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp. 640, 641 (N.D. 111. 1936) (distinguish-
ing Fuller and refusing to uphold a patent directed to a vending machine that gave the user the
[Vol. 53:159
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device was said to have legal uses aside from its usefulness for gam-
bling, then the court would find utility in the invention. 52 However,
where the invention's claims were ambiguous, or where they
presented utility only as a gambling device, the court refused to infer
legitimate use, even where such use was demonstrated before the
court.53 Based on the uncertainty inherent in all such games, courts
would conclude that gambling was the only possible use for the inven-
tions and, thereby, invalidate the patents.54 By the 1940s, however,
courts found patentable utility in games used for innocent amusement
that had no gambling purpose.55
2. Moral Utility and Patentable Utility Under the 1952 Patent Act
The first major revision to the original 1790 Patent Act did not
come until 1952 and restated many of the fundamental principles es-
tablished under the earlier law. 56 The Act solidified the requirements
of proper subject matter, utility, novelty, and nonobviousness for pat-
ent protection. 57 Specifically, § 101 of the 1952 law stated that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title."' 58 However, like the earlier law,
the 1952 Act did not elaborate on how the USPTO and the courts
chance to excavate a prize from a small gravel pit with a mechanical shovel because it was "at
most a device for playing a game of chance" and no other use than for gambling could be found).
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
53. Meyer, 15 F. Supp. at 641. The Court stated that the coin-operated crane machine offered
no utility because as "the demonstration in court showed, the invention cannot be made to so
operate as to be a real vending machine delivering to the customer with certainty the merchan-
dise he may desire. I do not believe the progress of science or the useful arts will be aided by
this invention."
54. Id.
55. Compare Callison v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1934) (holding a pinball machine patent
invalid while it considered Justice Story's formulation of the moral utility doctrine and Robin-
son's "public benefit" formulation), with Cusano v. Kotler, 159 F.2d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 1947)
(upholding a patent for a game similar to shuffleboard, stating that "[b]ecause of the cultural and
prophylactic importance of games in our social structure, and the additional relevant factor of
the huge annual expenditure for recreation, we can properly conclude that the creation of a new
game conforms to the patent requirement of being useful").
56. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 8-10 (stating that although the 1836 revision of the
Patent Act ended the pro forma registration system under the 1790 Act and instituted a formal
system of examination, it was not until the 1952 Act that Congress entirely redrafted the laws
governing the patent system).
57. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (defining patentable subject matter and the requirement for
utility), 102 (defining novelty as a condition for patentability), 103 (requiring non-obviousness),
112 (defining the written description requirement for patent applications as "the best mode con-
templated by the inventor of carrying out his invention") (1952).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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were to apply the utility requirement.5 9 Therefore, the courts were
again left to define patentable utility without any detailed guidance
from Congress.
The first comprehensive look at utility under the 1952 Patent Act
came a little over a decade after it became law. In 1966, the United
States Supreme Court formulated what remains the highest authority
on the scope and purpose of patentable utility.60 The patent at issue
in Brenner v. Manson claimed a chemical compound that was closely
related to another compound with known and useful properties.61
The inventor asserted that because this closely-related compound was
known to be useful, his discovery was as well.62 In denying the patent
for lack of utility, the Court emphasized that "[t]he basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a pat-
ent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention
with substantial utility. '' 63 Utility, therefore, is not merely a statutory
requirement, but a constitutional one. 64
The Court reasoned that the unpredictability of the chemical arts
meant that any possible utility flowing from this discovery would have
to be completely prospective. 65 Its close relation to a useful com-
pound could not remedy the invention's lack of utility. 66 Further-
more, the Court stated that "[a] patent is not a hunting license. It is
not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful con-
clusion."'67 To be patentable, an invention must have "specific" and
"substantial utility" which, by the patent grant, bestows a "specific
benefit" on the public. 68 The Court did not express whether patenta-
ble utility excluded the concept of moral utility, instead focusing its
59. Id. (merely describing that a useful invention may be eligible for protection, but offering
no definition of that term).
60. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 519 (1966). Although the Court addressed § 101 of the
Patent Act in Chakrabarty, it dealt entirely with the issue of patentable subject matter, whereas
Brenner specifically addressed utility under the 1952 law. Id. at 534.
61. Id. at 531 (stating that the invention's utility was by reference to findings published in a
scientific article and was purported to "reveal that an adjacent homologue of the steroid yielded
by his process has been demonstrated to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice, and that this
discloses the requisite utility").
62. Id.
63. Id. at 534.
64. Edward C. Walterscheid, "Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional
Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 327 (2002). The article discussed the
general holding of Brenner and noted that "the Court indicated that utility is a constitutional
requirement and not merely a statutory one. In so indicating, however, it failed to suggest what
language of the Patent Clause created such a requirement." Id.
65. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532.
66. Id. at 536.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 534-35. The Court explained:
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definition on the contractual quality of the public benefit derived from
the patent grant. 69
It was not until 1977 that a court specifically addressed the concept
of moral utility under the 1952 Patent Act; the patent at issue was for
a device used solely for gambling.70 In Ex parte Murphy,71 the Patent
and Trade Office Board of Appeals reversed the examiner's rejection
of a slot machine patent on the basis of 35 U.S.C § 101.72 The court
based its finding on the simple language of the 1952 law and held that
there was no basis in the statute to conclude that gambling machines
were completely void of patentable utility.73 Furthermore, the court
emphatically denied any ability of the USPTO to judge morality in
patent prosecutions for gambling devices and stated:
[W]e think this Office should not be the agency which seeks to en-
force a standard ofmorality with respect to gambling, by refusing,
on the ground of lack of patentable utility, to grant a patent on a
game of chance if the requirements of the Patent Act otherwise
have been met.74
Therefore, the USPTO will not reject patents for gambling devices for
lack of utility based on moral reservations.
The predecessor to the modern United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit stated a similar view regarding the USPTO's role
in determining public safety and the patenting of pharmaceutical com-
pounds. In re Anthony75 in 1969 and In re Watson76 in 1975 both con-
cerned appeals from USPTO rejections based on lack of utility and
[A] process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to
the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted
only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until the process claim has been reduced to
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly
are not capable of precise delineation .... The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by
the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is re-
fined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists in currently available
form-there is insufficient justification in permitting an applicant to engross what
might prove to be a broad field.
Id.
69. Id. (stating that a patent with only vague utility "may confer power to block off whole
areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public").
70. Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 803 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1977).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 802 (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), which states simply that "[w]hoever invents
or discovers a new and useful process . . .or any new and useful improvement thereof may
obtain a patent").
74. Id. at 803.
75. In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
76. In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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rejected the non-"injurious" component of Justice Story's utility for-
mulation.7 7 In both cases, the examiner rejected the applicants' inven-
tions for lack of utility because the pharmaceutical compounds, when
applied to humans, had serious potential for harm or possible deadly
side effects.78 The United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals reversed the rejections, stating that safety was not a component
of patentable utility.79
Furthermore, in rejecting the administration of public safety for the
USPTO due to the explicit reservation of that role to agencies such as
the Food and Drug Administration, the court explicitly stated that:
[w]ith regard to the ... nature of "safety" in the field of drugs ...
we take judicial notice that many valued therapeutic substances ....
when administered to lower animals or humans, entail certain risks
or may have undesirable side effects. True it is that such substances
would be more useful if they were not dangerous . . . but the fact
remains that they are useful, useful to doctors, veterinarians and
research workers, useful to patients ... and so are useful within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.80
In 1980, the Supreme Court again took up the proper interpretation
of 35 U.S.C. § 101, but focused on the definition of patentable subject
matter instead of utility.81 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,8 2 the patent at
issue claimed a "human-made, genetically engineered bacterium...
capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil. ''83 Spe-
77. See supra notes 14, 45 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Story's moral utility defi-
nition and a later application resulting in the "injurious" prong of his test for patentable utility).
78. Anthony, 414 F.2d at 1386-93. The USPTO granted a patent for the active ingredient in
the drug Monase after the Upjohn Company proffered evidence of clinical safety and relatively
low incidence of side effects in both its patent application and for Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval. Id. After prolonged market use, however, Upjohn requested that the FDA
remove the drug from availability due to several publicized incidents of acute blood disease and
death. Id. As a result of the FDA's removal of the drug from use, the USPTO revoked the
patent for lack of utility citing those safety concerns. Id. See also Watson, 517 F.2d at 474-75
(rejecting a patent application for lack of utility on an over-the-counter mouthwash containing
0.2% hexachlorophene after the FDA issued a directive indicating that the compound had signif-
icant toxic effects in humans and specifically limited the acceptable use of the compound to no
more than 0.1%).
79. Anthony, 414 F.2d at 1394; Watson, 517 F.2d at 475.
80. Watson, 517 F.2d at 475. The case referred to In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, (C.C.P.A. 1962),
which refused to reserve safety as a function of the USPTO, stating:
We believe that Congress has recognized this problem and has clearly expressed its
intent to give statutory authority and responsibility in this area to Federal agencies
different than that given to the Patent Office. This is so because the standards estab-
lished by statute for the advertisement, use, sale or distribution of drugs are quite dif-
ferent than the requirements under the Patent Act for the issuance of a patent.
Id.
81. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
82. Id.
83. Id. The Court explained that:
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cifically, the patent claimed not only the process to produce the bacte-
rium, but also the bacterium itself.84 The issue before the Court was
whether 35 U.S.C. § 101's restriction of patents to only a "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" could include the
claimed bacterium.85 In opposition to issuing a patent for the bacte-
rium, the USPTO argued first that the language of § 101 did not in-
clude microorganisms 86 and, more importantly, that until Congress
expressly authorizes patent protection for living organisms, the office
should not so greatly expand patentable subject matter.87 The
USPTO argued specifically that "genetic technology was unforeseen
when Congress enacted § 101 ... [and] ... [t]he legislative process...
is best equipped to weigh the competing economic, social, and scien-
tific considerations involved ...88
Following the evolution of the Patent Act, and in light of Commit-
tee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act, the Court relied heavily on
the fact that "Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include
anything under the sun that is made by man"' and reversed the
Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids control the oil degradation abil-
ities of certain bacteria. In particular, the two researchers discovered plasmids capable
of degrading ... two components of crude oil. In the work represented by the patent
application at issue here, Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different
plasmids, capable of degrading four different oil components, could be transferred to
and maintained stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium, which itself has no capacity
for degrading oil.
Id.
84. Id. at 305-06 (describing the patent claims as being "of three types: first, process claims for
the method of producing the bacteria; second, claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier
material floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and third, claims to the bacteria
themselves").
85. Id. at 307.
86. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310-11. The Court related the USPTO's first argument that
relied
on the enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which afforded patent protection to
certain asexually reproduced plants, and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, which
authorized protection for certain sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria
from its protection. In the [USPTO's] view, the passage of these Acts evidences con-
gressional understanding that the terms 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' [from
35 U.S.C. § 101] do not include living things; if they did, .. .neither Act would have
been necessary.
Id. at 310-11.
87. Id. at 314.
88. Id. at 314-15. The USPTO relied on the earlier decision of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
596 (1978), which held that the judiciary "must proceed cautiously when ... asked to extend
patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress," and stated that "Flook did not an-
nounce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the patent
laws were enacted are unpatentable per se." Id.
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USPTO's rejection.8 9 The Court concluded that Chakrabarty's bacte-
rium itself was patentable because it was a "nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human ingenu-
ity ... ."90 Furthermore, the Court noted that the provisions of § 101,
coupled with its legislative history,
have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statu-
tory goal of promoting "the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts" with all that means for the social and economic benefits envi-
sioned by Jefferson. Broad general language is not necessarily am-
biguous when congressional objectives require broad terms.91
Notably, the Court did not conclude its opinion merely by illuminat-
ing the legal reasoning behind its decision to grant patent protection
in living organisms. 92 The USPTO implored the Court to consider the
scientific and social implications of allowing patents on life.93 Specifi-
cally, the USPTO asked the Court to consider testimony from notable
scientists about the dangers of genetic engineering and the slippery
slope of proceeding without clear congressional guidance that "may
result in a loss of genetic diversity, and ... may tend to depreciate the
value of human life."' 94 Sweeping aside this argument against patent-
ing the products of genetic manipulation, the Court stated:
[t]he grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to
put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large
amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher
had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available sug-
gests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter
the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than
Canute could command the tides. Whether [Chakrabarty's] claims
are patentable may determine whether research efforts are acceler-
ated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that
is all.
9 5
89. Id. at 309. The Court noted that "[tihis same language was employed by P. J. Federico, a
principal draftsman of the 1952 recodification, in his testimony regarding that legislation:
'[Under] section 101 a person may have invented a machine or a manufacture, which may in-
clude anything under the sun that is made by man . . ."') (citations omitted).
90. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10 ("Judged in this light, respondent's micro-organism
plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product
of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character [and] use.").
91. Id. at 315 (referring to Jefferson's broad goals for the patent system under the 1790 Act).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
92. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
93. See id. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 317. Canute the Great, who lived in the eleventh century A.D., is regarded as the
first ruler of a united England. Legend has it that Canute had learned that his flattering court-
iers claimed he was so powerful, he could command the tides of the sea to go back. Canute,
understanding his limitations better than his courtiers (as well as the height of the tides on that
[Vol. 53:159
2003] MONSTERS AT THE PATENT OFFICE
Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress had, in fact, limited the
subject matter of patents under 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) by specifically ex-
cluding inventions utilizing nuclear material from patentable subject
matter.96 However, Congress alone should make any decision to ex-
clude the products of genetic manipulation from patentable subject
matter.9
7
Traditionally, Justice Story's formulation of moral utility also pro-
hibited patents for illegal devices that were "injurious to the ... good
policy ... of society."'98 However, it is unclear what effect outright
illegality or banning of an invention by Congress or federal agencies
might have on a court's evaluation of patentable utility.99 In Whistler
Corp. v. Autotronics Inc., 1°° the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas alluded to the effect of a complete ban and
rejected the argument that a patent for a radar detection device used
in automobiles was invalid for lack of utility because its primary pur-
pose was to circumvent law enforcement. The court concluded that
the legislative branch was more capable of determining the ability of
the public to use the devices and stated that "[u]nless and until detec-
tors are banned outright, or Congress acts to withdraw patent protec-
tion for them, radar patentees are entitled to the protection of the
particular day) had his throne carried to the seashore and sat on it as the tide came in, command-
ing the waves to advance no further. See generally Barrie Markham Rhodes, Canute (Knud) The
Great, The Viking Network, at http://www.viking.no/e/people/e-knud.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2003).
96. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) directs that "[n]o patent shall hereafter
be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nu-
clear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. Any patent granted for any such invention
or discovery is hereby revoked, and just compensation shall be made therefor." 42 U.S.C. § 2181
(2001).
97. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318. The Court noted that:
Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms
produced by genetic engineering ... [o]r it may choose to craft a statute specifically
designed for such living things. But, until Congress takes such action, this Court must
construe the language of § 101 as it is. The language of that section fairly embraces
respondent's invention.
Id.
98. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
99. Congress has, however, specifically prohibited the USPTO from granting patents directed
to atomic weapons by removing them from patentable subject matter. See generally 42 U.S.C
§ 2181(a); supra note 96 and accompanying text.
100. Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1886 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(noting that "[n]otwithstanding Whistler's evidence to the contrary that the instant detectors
have other uses, the court remains of the view that the primary and almost exclusive purpose for
the radar detectors ... is to circumvent law enforcement attempts to detect and apprehend those
who violate the law").
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patent laws." 10 1 This ruling suggested that a congressional declaration
of illegality of an invention might lead to patent invalidity due to lack
of utility. Although this ruling only represents the conclusion of one
federal court, and the USPTO and higher federal courts have not yet
addressed this specific issue, the decision implied that the legal rea-
soning connecting illegality with patentable utility was at least
attainable.
3. The Modern State of Utility
Since the Supreme Court rulings of Brenner and Chakrabarty deter-
mined the meaning of § 101, the courts, scholars, and the USPTO
have struggled to formulate a workable definition of patentable util-
ity.'0 2 Most modern explanations include Brenner's requirements of
specific and substantial utility.10 3 Although the USPTO does not in-
clude specific references to Justice Story's moral component in their
examination process for all applications, the agency does consider the
doctrine in some instances. 10 4 However, the USPTO does not specifi-
cally recognize the "benefit derived by the public" component of util-
ity evident in the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brenner.t0 5 In 1999,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered the requirements for
101. Id. The court went further to conclude that "the matter is one for the legislatures of the
states, or for Congress to decide .... " and that, "[a]bsent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, this court cannot and should not substitute its own views in place of those of the PTO,
the several legislatures, or the Congress." id.
102. See cases cited supra note 36; Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline, 213 F. Supp. 2d
597, 610 (E.D. Vir. 2002) (using a pre-1952 formulation of patentable utility that included moral-
ity: "[a] patent possesses utility 'if it will operate to perform the functions and secure the results
intended, and its use is not contrary to law, moral principles, or public policy' ") (quoting Calli-
son v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55, 58 (10th Cir. 1934)).
103. Philips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1105 (D. Del. 1987),
affd, 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding utility in a chemical product where because "the
description of utility . . . is specific enough so as not to be insufficient as a matter of law.");
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). The Guidelines state: "A
claimed invention must have a specific and substantial utility. This requirement excludes 'throw-
away,' 'insubstantial,' or 'nonspecific' utilities, such as the use of a complex invention as landfill,
as a way of satisfying the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101." Id.
104. See infra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
105. Compare Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (stating that "[tlhe basic quid pro
quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the
benefit derived by the public. ) with Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.
The Guidelines state:
By statute, a patent is required to disclose one practical utility. If a well-established
utility is readily apparent, the disclosure is deemed to be implicit. If an application fails
to disclose one specific, substantial, and credible utility, and the examiner discerns no
well-established utility, the examiner will reject the claim under section 101.
66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.
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patentable utility in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.106 Though
the court limited the concept of moral utility as applied to mechanical
inventions, the court nevertheless signaled that it might consider mo-
rality a factor of utility under different conditions. 10 7
a. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang: The Federal Circuit's Consideration
of Moral Utility
The invention in Juicy Whip concerned a simple device found in
convenience store beverage dispensers that eliminated the step of
mixing the beverage in the machine before dispensing. 0 8 Juicy
Whip's patent was entitled "Post-Mix Beverage Dispenser With an
Associated Simulated Display of Beverage."' 1 9 The post-mix dis-
penser stored beverage concentrate and water in different locations
and did not mix the two until the customer dispensed the drink.110 A
pre-mix dispenser, however, stored the combined concentrate and
water in a top-mounted display bowl.' The lower court concluded
that the purpose of the display bowl was solely to stimulate impulse
buying.11 2 Juicy Whip's post-mix invention eliminated the problems
of contamination and frequent re-filling but nevertheless included the
pre-mix display bowl on its invention to increase impulse sales; Juicy
Whip included this deception as one of its claims. 113
106. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
107. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
108. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1365.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Juicy Whip specifically claimed:
[A] post-mix beverage dispenser of the type having an outlet for discharging beverage
components in predetermined proportions to provide a serving of dispensed beverage,
the improvement which comprises: a transparent bowl having no fluid connection with
the outlet and visibly containing a quantity of fluid; said fluid being resistant to organic
growth and simulating the appearance of the dispensed beverage ....
Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 1366. The Court stated that
[tihe [lower] court further held that the invention lacked utility because it 'improves the
prior art only to the extent that it increases the salability of beverages dispensed from
post-mix dispensers% an invention lacks utility, the court stated, if it confers no benefit
to the public other than the opportunity for making a product more salable.
Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366.
113. Id. at 1365-66. The Court stated that the specific claims that
said bowl positioned relative to the outlet to create the visual impression that said bowl
is the reservoir and principal source of the dispensed beverage from the outlet; and said
bowl and said quantity of fluid visible within said bowl cooperating to create the visual
impression that multiple servings of the dispensed beverage are stored within said bowl.
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Orange Bang moved for summary judgment on Juicy Whip's in-
fringement action on the ground that the invention lacked utility, and
the district court granted the motion.' 14 The district court reasoned
that the deceptive purpose of the invention was enough to invalidate
the patent for lack of utility and that the claimed improvement over
pre-mix dispensers was "not independent of its deceptive purpose,
and ... [was] ... insufficient to raise a disputed factual issue ... to a
jury."115 To support its view, the district court relied on the reasoning
of Justice Story in Lowell v. Lewis and two pre-1952 Patent Act
decisions. 116
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and re-
evaluated the concept of moral utility.117 The court noted that "the
principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to
serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in re-
cent years" but did not specifically discard the reasoning. 18 Merely,
the court declined to follow the reasoning offered in the early twenti-
eth century cases and stated that "the fact that one product can be
altered to make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit suffi-
cient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility."119 Significantly,
the court noted that by Supreme Court reasoning, "Congress never
intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the
States, meaning by that term those powers by which the health, good
order, peace, and general welfare of the community are promoted.' 20
In conclusion, the court emphasized that:
Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatent-
able for a variety of reasons ... [but] until such time as Congress
does so.... we find no basis in § 101 to hold that inventions can be
ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the
capacity to fool some members of the public.12 1
Like the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the court also
noted 42 U.S.C § 2181(a) and the congressional exclusion of inven-
tions utilizing nuclear material. 2 2 Therefore, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals only limited the application of moral utility to cer-
tain types of mechanical inventions and cited Congress as the true ar-
114. Id, at 1366.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1366-67.
117. Id. at 1365.
118. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366-67.
119. Id. at 1367 (noting the "significant" advancement of the sciences offered by such inven-
tions as cubic zirconium, imitation leather, and simulated grill markings on hamburger patties).
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biter of morality as applied to inventions. 123 Arguably, this limitation
might allow the court to re-examine the doctrine in different contexts
should the need arise.
b. Scholarly Recognition of Moral Utility
Professor Donald S. Chisum recognized the Supreme Court re-
quirement enunciated in Brenner and included the moral component
kept alive by the Juicy Whip decision as one of the tests for patentable
utility.124 Chisum recognized three basic tests for patentable utility:
"First, it must be operable and capable of use. It must operate and
perform the functions and secure the result intended. Second, it must
operate to achieve some minimum human purpose. Third, it must
achieve a human purpose that is not illegal, immoral or contrary to
public policy."'1 25 To further explain the third requirement, he stated
that "an invention must perform some function of positive benefit to
society."1 26
However, like the Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip, Chisum's recogni-
tion of a beneficial or moral component to patentable utility came
with sharp limitations. The "public policy doctrine" should only de-
stroy an invention's patentable utility "if the invention cannot be used
for any honest and moral purpose."'1 27 Furthermore, due to the ever-
shifting and expanding concept of morality within our society, "the
courts should not apply subjective ideas of honesty and morality"
when considering utility.128 Apart from the statements in Juicy Whip
and the narrow deliberation of the topic by Professor Chisum, negligi-
ble authority exists for modern application of morality to patentable
utility.129
123. Id.
124. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.03 Utility: Illegal, Immoral, and Harmful
Inventions (2002).
125. 1 id. § 4.01 Utility: Introduction, at 4-2.1.
126. 1 id. at 4-2 (referring to The Patent Act of 1790 which "extended patents to any useful
art" and the 1793 and 1836 laws that continued the same requirement; further, that "[a] person
cannot obtain a valid patent for an invention that will not in fact operate to perform its desig-
nated function or that will only perform mischievous or harmful functions").
127. 1 id. § 4.03, at 4-17.
128. 1 id.
129. Reflecting what might be considered scholarly rejection of the moral utility concept, Pro-
fessor Chisum relied entirely on two sources in support of his ideas about morality and patenta-
ble utility: one law school casebook author's point of view (R. CHOAT, PATENT LAW - CASES
AND MATERIALS 380 (1973)), and broad dicta from Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801,
802 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1977). In Ex parte Murphy, the court stated that:
We find ourselves in agreement with appellants and recognize that while some may
consider gambling to be injurous to the public morals and the good order of society, we
cannot find any basis in 35 U.S.C. § 101 or related sections which justify a conclusion
2003]
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c. The USPTO and Moral Utility
The USPTO revised its Utility Examination Guidelines in 1995 and
2001 to more closely reflect the utility formulation announced in
Brenner. In doing so, the USPTO focused its definition on specific,
substantial, and credible utility. 130 The 2001 revised guidelines stated:
[i]f the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention is useful for
any particular practical purpose (i.e. it has a 'specific and substantial
utility') and that assertion would be considered credible by a person
of ordinary skill in the art, do not impose a rejection based on lack
of utility.
13 1
Neither the guidelines nor the training materials accompanying
them made any reference to a moral requirement for patentable util-
ity.132 Although the guidelines did not alter the substantive require-
ments of the Patent Act, nor did they constitute "rulemaking carrying
the force of law," they provided insight into the examination process
and the basis for the USPTO procedure for evaluating patentable
utility. 133
Before officially adopting the guidelines in 2001, the USPTO
opened them for public debate. 134 Comments on the new utility ex-
amination guidelines raised some pertinent issues regarding morality
as a function of patentable utility.135 In particular, individual com-
ments focused on the patentability of human genetic sequences and
the confusion about the possibility of patents conferring ownership
that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable
utility.
Id.
130. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). See also Revised In-
terim Utility Guidelines Training Materials 3 (stating that "[t]he examiner should determine
whether any asserted utility is specific and substantial, and if so, determine whether such as-
serted utility is credible"), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2003).
131. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098.
132. Id. at 1092.
133. Id. at 1098. "The Guidelines do not alter the substantive requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101
.... The Guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking and hence do not have the force
and effect of law. Rejections will be based upon the substantive law, and it is these rejections
which are appealable.").
134. Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines; Request for Comments; Correction, 65
Fed. Reg. 3425 (Jan. 21, 2000).
135. See generally PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE UNITED
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, "REVISED UTILITY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES,"
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comlsol/comments/utilguide/index.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2003). Most individual comments concerned the issue of patents on the human
genome claiming certain property rights in humans; the USPTO flatly rejected these comments.
However, scientific research organizations reacted favorably to the new guidelines.
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rights in humans. 136 These comments implicated the moral utility doc-
trine as grounds for rejecting patents related to discoveries surround-
ing the human genome project and human gene sequences in
general. 137 The USPTO flatly rejected these comments and stated
broadly that "[platents do not confer ownership . . . " but merely the
right to exclude, which is a limited property right that does not include
title to the product of the invention claimed by the patent. 138 The
office went further to emphasize that patentable utility makes no con-
sideration of an invention's marketability and that the sole determina-
tion of utility is confined to those inventions exhibiting a "specific,
substantial, and credible utility."'1 39
B. The Modern Challenge to Moral Utility
Even as judges, scholars, and the USPTO minimize the importance
of moral utility, emerging technologies have renewed interest in the
doctrine and point to its continued viability. As the USPTO and Con-
gress grapple with inventions that might transform traditional notions
of humanity and medical science through genetic manipulation, the
doctrine of moral utility has emerged as an expedient, albeit imper-
fect, solution. The USPTO's reaction to recent applications directed
to inventions that involved mixing human and nonhuman DNA and
the current debate surrounding human cloning provide the clearest
136. Id.
137. Id. See id. cmt. 14 (Jim Huber, Director of Molecular and Human Genetics, Baylor Col-
lege of Medicine, stated "I believe that at least [sic] human genomic sequence goes to the core of
what it means to be human and no individual or corporation should have control or ownership of
something so basic."). Debra Harry, Director, Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism,
stated:
The prudent course would be for the Patent and Trademark Office to seek clarification
from Congress on whether naturally occurring genetic sequences are properly subject
to the patenting system. In the interim, the USPTO should impose a moratorium on
patenting of genetic sequences. The extension of patents to genetic sequences is a
profound misuse of patent system and represents the privatization, only to support cor-
porate interests, of something that is not an invention and should not be subject to
corporate ownership. No individual, institution, or corporation should be able to claim
ownership over species or varieties of organisms.
Id. cmt. 39.
138. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). The USPTO's view
regarding the scope of rights conferred by the patent comports with most interpretations. See
MERGES & DuFFy, supra note 7, at 48. The authors stated that the patent,
[u]nlike other forms of property,... includes only the right to exclude and nothing else.
Patent rights are wholly negative rights-rights to stop others from using-not positive
rights to use the invention. Thus, inventors and patent holders may be barred from
practicing their inventions without creating any conflict with the basic patent.
Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1094.
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evidence to date of moral utility's persistent presence in modern pat-
ent law. Furthermore, inadequate congressional responses to mount-
ing public pressure against human cloning signal another possibility
for application of the doctrine.
1. Chimeras and the Human Cloning Debate
The USPTO faced a particularly controversial situation in 1998
when an inventor forced the agency to deal with new questions about
moral utility. Biotechnology activist Jeremy Rifkin and cell biologist
Stuart Newman filed an application involving chimeric embryos that
contained both human and nonhuman cells. 140 A chimera is "an imag-
inary monster compounded of incongruous parts" or as the applica-
tion related, "an individual, organ, or part consisting of tissues of
diverse genetic constitution .... ",141 The Rifkin-Newman application
included variations of human chimeras including one claim for a part
human, part rat creation.142 The application was highly publicized by
the scientists as an attempt to prevent others from practicing what
they considered an immoral invention and to spark debate concerning
the limits of morality and science in patent law.143
The USPTO responded with an immediate press release in an at-
tempt to stem the tide of criticism directed toward the office and its
policies. The release recognized that the USPTO must issue patents
"without discriminating against a particular field of technology" and
stated that "[i]t is the position of the USPTO that inventions directed
to human/non-human chimera could, under certain circumstances, not
be patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet
the public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement. 144
140. See Ho, supra note 3, at 247.
141. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 223 (1989).
142. See Slater, supra note 3, at 21. "Concoctions included the huMouse, a mixture of man
and mouse; the humanzee, a cross between a human and a chimpanzee; and blends of human
with pig and human with baboon .... The [inventions] could potentially be used to study
embryonic development, raise organs for transplants, or test new drugs." It is important to note
that the chimeras claimed in the application are not hybrids, or the heterogeneous genetic blend-
ing of two animals where every cell of the resulting animal would contain a portion of each host's
DNA. By Rifkin's invention, the resulting animal would be made up of tissue containing the
complete genetic material of each host, creating a disconnected patchwork of human and non-
human cells.
143. See Ho, supra note 3, at 247-48.
144. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FACTS ON PATENTING LIFE FORMS HAVING A RE-
LATIONSHIP TO HUMANS (Apr. 1, 1998), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/
speeches/98-06.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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The USPTO later retracted its stance on moral utility and instead
rejected the application on subject matter grounds. 45 The examiner's
explanation of the rejection relied on earlier USPTO guidance con-
cerning the patentability of animals which stated that "[t]he grant of a
limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by
the Constitution.' 1 46 Although the USPTO did not specify which con-
stitutional provision gave rise to this limitation, most scholars believe
that the office was referring to the Thirteenth Amendment prohibi-
tion on slavery. 147 Since the initial rejection in 1999, the USPTO has
made no further statements in reaction to the Rifkin-Newman
application. 148
Recent statements by the USPTO in response to press inquiries
about an issued patent further explain the stance taken in response to
the 1998 Chimera application. In April 2001, the USPTO granted the
University of Missouri a patent that may include human cloning. 149
Generally, the patent covered a process for genetically modifying pigs
for use as human organ donors.150  The specific patent claims de-
scribed a process for turning unfertilized eggs into embryos, the pro-
duction of cloned mammals using that technique, and specifically
claimed the use of human eggs. 151 As stated earlier, based on the
human-animal chimera rejection, the USPTO policy against patenting
humans rested on the Constitution's prohibition of slavery. However,
in light of recent controversy surrounding the University of Missouri
patent, the USPTO stated that "the agency was not using the 13th [sic]
Amendment argument anymore, but was not granting patents on
humans because it had not received any guidance from Congress or
145. See Ho, supra note 3, at 249-50 (citing Patent Application is Disallowed as 'Embracing' a
Human Being, 58 PAT.,TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 203 (1999)). It should be noted that, as a
matter of policy, the USPTO will not release any official comments about an examiner's reason-
ing for rejection of a specific application; all information about the rejected application comes
from the applicants, Rifkin and Stewart.
146. Id. at 250 (citing U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Animals - Patentability, 1077 OFF.
GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24 (1987)).
147. Id. at 251.
148. See Slater, supra note 3, at 20-28 (noting that the Rifkin application was still being evalu-
ated by the USPTO and was rejected by the office for the third time in August 2000). The
applicants have refused to submit detailed information concerning the application or the
USPTO's grounds for rejection as such information "could jeopardize their ability to secure a
patent on their process." Id.
149. Andrew Pollack, Debate on Human Cloning Turns to Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2002,
at 14.
150. See generally U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued Apr. 3, 2001), available at http://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/srchnum.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
151. Id. at claims 1, 20, and 12, respectively.
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the courts saying it should do so. '"152 Although the exact limits of the
University of Missouri patent may not be clearly drawn to humans,
several authorities speculated that the patent could give the holder the
exclusive right to this process as applied to humans and its products. a5 3
Recent testimony by a USPTO representative before the Presiden-
tial Council on Bioethics provided the clearest enunciation to date of
the Office's policy toward human cloning and moral utility. A Super-
visory Patent Examiner advised the Council on behalf of the USPTO
to recommend that Congress clarify the current patentable subject
matter statutes rather than rely on the moral utility doctrine to effect
any change in current United States patent laws.154 Referring to the
prior USPTO statements surrounding the Rifkin-Stewart chimera ap-
plication, and congressional testimony regarding the patentability of
humans, she stated that:
[i]n the 15 years since it was notified of the USPTO's interpreta-
tions, Congress has apparently acquiesced to the USPTO interpre-
tation . . . [that] . . . [t]he current policy [of the USPTO] . . . is to
consider any claim encompassing a human being at any stage of de-
velopment . . . not to be patent eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.155
152. See Pollack, supra note 149. Quinn, a USPTO Representative, also stated that the patent
office did not comment on individual patents, but had not changed its policy of not issuing pat-
ents drawn to humans. Id.
153. Id. The article notes the opinion of several attorneys that concluded that the patent
appears to specifically claim a process for cloning a human embryo. However, the specific claim
is drawn to an embryo, which courts have concluded is not a person through abortion-rights
precedent. This fact may limit any application of the Thirteenth Amendment to this or any other
particular patent claiming embryos rather than humans. Id.
154. Karen Hauda, Remarks at the Meeting of the President's Council on Bioethics, Session
5, Regulation 3: Patentability of Human Organisms 1, History and Current Law (June 20, 2002),
available at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/un02/jun21session5.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2003) (stating that "[t]he President's Council on Bioethics may also want to consider recom-
mending that Congress clarify its intent regarding patent-eligible subject matter").
155. Id. Hauda further stated:
It should be noted, however, that in holding the microorganisms for patent eligible
subject matter, the Supreme Court [in Diamond v. Chakrabarty] was aware of the
lower court's view that we are not dealing with patent eligibility of all living things,
including man. The USPTO concluded that inventions covering human beings are not
within the scope of section 101, and in 1987, published a notice in the USPTO's official
gazette advising the public of its conclusions. The USPTO concluded that Congress
never intended for a human being to be considered a manufacturer [sic] or a composi-
tion of matter under the patent law. More recently, an immediate advisory issued in
1998, the USPTO reiterated its policy that an invention, including within its scope a
human being, could not be considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because it would be against public policy to do so. Shortly after the USPTO
published its notice of intent not to patent human beings, it informed Congress of the
decision by direct testimony in a 1987 hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee
on Judiciary, House of Representatives, on the patents on the Constitution of Trans-
2003] MONSTERS AT THE PATENT OFFICE
Furthermore, she stated that the USPTO's reasoning for this policy
was based on three considerations. First, § 101 itself restricts patents
to the "categories of process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter" and the ordinary meaning of these terms does not include a
human being. 156 Second, "[c]onferring exclusive rights over a human
being would also raise constitutional questions .... 157 Third, and
most importantly, "courts have interpreted the utility requirement to
exclude inventions deemed to be injurious to the well-being, good
public policy, or good morals of society. 1' 58 In reference to the
USPTO's last consideration, the Patent Examiner specifically noted
that although the Juicy Whip decision left this last consideration un-
certain, there was viable judicial reasoning concluding that patents
may be invalid for lack of utility on morality grounds. 159 The
genic Animals. On June 11th, 1987 the USPTO's Assistant Commissioner testified that
a claim, including a human being within its scope, will not be considered to be patenta-
ble subject matter.
Id.
156. Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); see also supra text accompanying note 58.
157. See Hauda, supra note 154; see also Arti Rai, Remarks at the Meeting of the President's
Council on Bioethics, Session 6, Regulation 4: Patentability of Human Organisms 2: Ethics and
Public Policy (June 20, 2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/jun02/
june21session6.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). Rai also stated:
The 13th Amendment, as many of you probably know, bans not only slavery, but also
what is known as involuntary servitude. And it seems to me that a patent on a human
people could be deemed to impose an involuntary servitude. Now, the 13th Amend-
ment jurisprudence . . . has needless to say focused on cases where there has been a
physical or legal compulsion to work . . . But it seems to me that property rights that
entirely disallow an individual from choosing his or her employment, or choosing to
work in the first place, could fall within the scope of the amendment. In addition, the
patentee's control [of an invention directed to human cloning and] of the patented
beings' right to reproduce . . . seems to . . . implicate the protections of the 14th
Amendment .... So the 13th and 14th Amendments provides [sic] the best justification
for the PTO's current policy to the extent that it disallows product patents on full
human beings.
Id.
158. See Hauda, supra note 154.
159. Id. Hauda stated:
Any actions taken by the USPTO must have legal basis under Title 35 of the United
States Code, as interpreted by the Federal Courts of the United States. The USPTO
also lacks substantive rule making authority. Legal challenges will therefore likely be
raised to the USPTO's interpretation of statutory subject matter under Section 101. A
challenge to the non-patentability of human beings would be a case of first impression
to the court. The resulting outcome, especially on public policy grounds, is uncertain.
In the Juicy Whip case, the Federal Circuit questioned the continued viability of the
principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral or
illegal purposes, noting that this reasoning has not been applied broadly in recent years.
In addition to the role of the USPTO as a gatekeeper for the public, it is recognized
that strong patent protection has been vital to the development and commercialization
of innovations in biotechnology.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:159
USPTO's official position, therefore, is that moral utility is still a via-
ble basis for an application's rejection, but that in light of Juicy Whip,
that basis is tenuous. Additionally, the USPTO contends that con-
gressional clarification on patentable subject matter, rather than reli-
ance on their own formulation of the utility requirement, would be the
best avenue for regulation of patents directed to human cloning.' 60
2. Congressional Responses to Human Cloning
In late July 2001, the United States House of Representatives
passed the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001(H.R. 2505), by a
majority of over one hundred votes.161 The bill provided criminal and
civil penalties for anyone who knowingly performs human cloning,
participates in an attempt to clone a human, or receives any product
of human cloning. 162 The bill, however, contained no restrictions on
patents directed to human cloning. 163 Since 2001, congressional ef-
forts to push through an anticloning measure have not resulted in a
federal law. Four anticloning measures were active during the 107th
Congress. 164 One Senate bill, S. 1899, was identical to H.R. 2505, and
had more support than similar Senate bills, with the names of no less
than thirty senators attached to it as cosponsors. 65 However, Senate
160. See Hauda, supra note 154. Hauda also stated:
The President's Council on Bioethics may also want to consider recommending that
Congress clarify its intent regarding patent-eligible subject matter .... However, any
restrictions that would limit the patent eligibility of biotechnology inventions must be
carefully crafted to avoid unintended consequences, such as general negative effect on
the investment in the biotechnology sector.
Id.
161. See generally Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302
(2002).
162. H.R. 2505. The Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, entity, public or private, in or affecting interstate
commerce, knowingly to perform or attempt to perform human cloning; to participate
in an attempt to perform human cloning; to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo
produced by human cloning or any product derived from such an embryo.
The measure provides for imprisonment for up to ten years and a civil fine of "not less
than $1,000,000 ..
Id.
163. See Pollack, supra note 149 (quoting the leading proponent of the human cloning ban in
the Senate, Sam Brownback, as stating "I think the patent office will appreciate having [the]
clarity [of a federal human cloning ban], given the applications that are coming into the patent
office"). It is unclear, however, as to what clarity the Senator referred, since no bill yet intro-
duced has considered patent issues as part of the cloning ban.
164. S. 1899, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2439. 107th Cong. (2002); and S. 1893, 107th Cong. (2002)
were all bipartisan measures while S. 1758, 107th Cong. (2001) was sponsored solely by
Democrats.
165. The Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 passed the House of Representatives as
H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001); the identical Senate bill was S. 1899. The other active Senate
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activity buried S. 1899 in committee in two sets of hearings and the
focus of all information-gathering was entirely on the implications of
the ban on stem cell research; no debate surfaced on the prohibition's
effects on the patent system or consideration of the USPTO's request
for clarification on the subject.166
Changes in the political composition of Congress resulting from the
November 2002 elections renewed the likelihood that an anticloning
measure will be passed during the 108th Congress. 167 Immediately af-
ter the elections, the White House announced that several measures
that had been stalled during the 107th Congress, including a ban on
reproductive human cloning, would be top priorities on the Presi-
dent's agenda.1 68 Also, the 108th Congress reintroduced an anti-clon-
ing measure on January 8, 2003.169 The House of Representatives
measure is identical to the previous bills H.R. 2505 and S. 1899.170
The measure did not go to immediate vote and it was referred to the
measures, S. 1758 and S. 1893, included more focus on and protection of stem cell research. See
S. 1893, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1758, 107th Cong. (2001); supra text accompanying note 164.
With the widest Senate support, S. 1899 focused exclusively on the specific prohibition of human
cloning. The only mention of possible medical research in S. 1899 was § 302(d) which stated
"[n]othing in this section restricts areas of scientific research not specifically prohibited by this
section, including research in the use of nuclear transfer or other cloning techniques to produce
molecules, DNA, cells other than human embryos, tissues, organs, plants, or animals other than
humans." S. 1899, 107th Cong. § 302(d) (2002).
166. See generally Human Cloning: Must We Sacrifice Medical Research in the Name of a Total
Ban?: Hearings on S. 1899 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002), available at
http:/ljudiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=147 (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
167. See generally R. W. Apple, Jr., President's Risks Are Rewarded at Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2002, at Al; Press Release, Council for Responsible Genetics, Momentum Builds in Congress
for a Cloning Ban (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.gene-watch.orgpress/cloning-010703.
html (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
168. White House Press Briefing (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releasesl2002111/20021106-1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). In the Briefing, Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer stated:
I think there's no question that last night's [election] results increase the likelihood of
getting things done for the American people. There are many initiatives that could have
and should have been done in the last Congress that got bottled up and stopped that
now have a much stronger chance of getting done. Having said that, of course, in the
Senate, if members decide that they still want to exercise all their parliamentary rights,
they can block, they can filibuster, they can use 60 votes to thwart a growing bipartisan
consensus. But let me ... walk through a list of the things that were left undone from
the last Congress that the President still remains very interested in. .... Some issues got
stuck in a House-Senate conference committee .... A ban on human cloning was
passed by the House and not take[n] up by the Senate. So there remain a wide variety
of issues that have not gotten done in this last closely divided Congress.
Id.
169. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003).
170. Compare S. 1899, 107th Cong. (2002) and H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2002) with H.R. 534,
108th Cong. (2003).
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House Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees. 171 Despite
the delay, the measure was debated and passed during the last week of
February 2003.172 Likewise, the sponsor of the original Senate initia-
tive, Senator Sam Brownback, reintroduced a full cloning ban as S.
245, or the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, in late January
2003.173
III. ANALYSIS
Despite any impending action in Congress on a reproductive clon-
ing ban in the United States, significant questions still remain about
the application of moral utility within- the United States patent system.
This section will address three major issues that limit moral utility's
application: first, the shortsightedness of future moral utility analysis
within the courts and the USPTO; second, the USPTO's legitimate
concern over continued reliance on the doctrine and the possible con-
flict with the United States Supreme Court precedent defining patent-
able subject matter; and third, the principle's inconsistency with the
policy goals of the United States patent system.
A. Possible Applications of Moral Utility
Although no judicial opinion has dismissed moral utility entirely, its
direct application to patentable utility is severely limited. The most
glaring difficulty recognized by the courts and the USPTO is that
moral utility most readily applies to an invention's use-a property
right not conferred by the patent grant. 174 With a federal ban on clon-
ing looming over the legislative horizon, illegality may be one avenue
for moral utility's function in modern patent law.
171. See H.R. 534, supra note 169, available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c108:H.R.534: (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (stating that the bill was "referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for such a period
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned").
172. See Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status Information, available at http://www.
congress.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.00534 (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). "Rule provides for
consideration of H.R. 534 with 1 hour of general debate. Previous question shall be considered
as ordered without intervening motions except motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Measure will be considered read. Specified amendments are in order."
173. See generally Press Release, Brownback Reaction to Human Cloning Claim (Dec. 27,
2002), available at http://www.brownback.senate.gov/LICloning.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003);
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, S. 245, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.
congress.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.245 (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
174. See MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 7 (stating "[p]atent rights are wholly negative rights-
rights to stop others from using-not positive rights to use the intervention") (emphasis in
original).
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1. The Federal Circuit Limitations on Moral Utility and the
Implications of Juicy Whip
The Federal Circuit refused to uphold the previous evaluation of
moral utility in Juicy Whip not because the doctrine was useless, but
because the lower court's application of the doctrine was flawed.
Juicy Whip specifically claimed the "simulated beverage display" to
increase sales. 175 The district court's conclusion that the invention
lacked utility because "it conferr[ed] no benefit to the public other
than the opportunity for making a product more salable" was funda-
mentally flawed because that reasoning included a moral judgment
not based upon accepted interpretations of § 101. The lower court
made the subjective determination that the public benefit of "making
a product more salable" was not enough for patentable utility; that the
stated utility was immoral and therefore unpatentable. Furthermore,
the cases relied upon by the lower court were not interpretations of
utility under the current 1952 Patent Act.
As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals stated, the lower court's
analysis included an impermissible personal evaluation of the inven-
tion's moral utility. The earliest cases invalidating gambling device
patents did so because of the prevalent statutory and social atmos-
phere of the time. These early decisions were not made in a judicial
vacuum; gambling was considered immoral by most members of soci-
ety. Almost all states and the federal government included criminal
penalties for gambling in various forms, and therefore, any invention
in support of those purposes was also immoral and lacked patentable
utility. 176 Furthermore, gambling was illegal in almost every jurisdic-
tion in the United States at that time. 77 These decisions survived, in
part, because their reasoning was not solely based on the judge's per-
sonal morality, but referred to the illegality of the device itself.
In Juicy Whip, the Federal Circuit only refused to follow the lower
court when it based its evaluation of utility on the deceptive function
175. See Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
176. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903). In dissent, Judge Grosscup stated:
Gambling and gambling devices are condemned by the laws of every state and terri-
tory, except perhaps New Mexico. Upon this it can be safely predicated that the con-
science of the people of the state in which this court sits; of the people of the three
states that constitute this circuit; indeed, of the people of every state and territory,
except a little territory bordering on Mexico, condemns the practice of gambling. Gam-
bling and gambling devices are condemned, also, by the enactments of congress ....
Thus the national conscience is seen to be outspoken against this practice. Nothing
could be conceived more conclusively showing a general conception of policy.




of the simulated beverage display. 78 Deception in the form of a simu-
lated beverage display, the court noted, was not illegal.' 79 The court
went on to illustrate several valid patents covering inventions de-
signed only to deceive. 180 Furthermore, the court noted that Orange
Bang did not argue that it was illegal to display a simulated represen-
tation of the beverage. 181 However, if Orange Bang had argued that
the invention was illegal, the court stated that administrative agencies
existed specifically for protecting "consumers from fraud and decep-
tion in the sale of food products."'182 Therefore, the fatal flaw in the
lower court's reasoning was not its invocation of moral utility, but its
improper application of the doctrine to an invention with a legal func-
tion and a lack of deference to specific regulatory agencies governing
illegal uses in the sale of food products. After Juicy Whip, one narrow
application of the moral utility doctrine might exist in a patent cover-
ing an invention that could serve no possible legal purpose and in
which no regulatory agency had the authority to restrict its use.
2. Possible Application of Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc.
Reasoning
One district court agreed with the reasoning that a total ban of a
particular invention would invalidate a patent for lack of utility. 183 In
an infringement action regarding automobile radar detectors, the
court reasoned that an outright prohibition of an invention might pro-
vide courts with clear and convincing evidence that an invention has
no patentable utility.184 Applying the same reasoning to the case of
human cloning, a court might find reasonable grounds for lack of pat-
entable utility from a complete federal ban of the claimed procedure.
Although it does not include a specific exclusion from patentable
subject matter for human cloning, the 2003 Human Cloning Prohibi-
tion Act may provide an avenue for denying such protection through
invalidity actions and reinforce the USPTO's reasoning for rejecting
such patents. Identical to the now defunct H.R. 2505, the proposed
law merely imposes criminal and civil liability on anyone who clones a
178. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366-67.
179. Id.
180. Id. (noting several well-known patents for deceptive products, such as cubic zirconium,
as designed to simulate diamond, U.S. Pat. No. 5,762,968, which covers a method for producing
imitation grill marks on food without heat, and U.S. Pat. No. 5,571,545, which covers an imita-
tion hamburger).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1368 (citing In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465 (C.C.P.A. 1975)).
183. See Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
184. See id.
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human. 185 Hearings and debate surrounding the old measure focused
on its implication for medical research and the issue of patentability
garnered little attention.1 86 As written, the new measure would pro-
vide guidance for the USPTO and courts to further apply moral utility
to reject patents directed to human cloning; however, even the en-
acted law would not be the best guidance. Inclusion of a measure,
such as 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a), which specifically excluded nuclear weap-
ons from patentable subject matter, would be the clearest form of gui-
dance for the USPTO and would provide the strongest possible basis
for rejection of a patent directed to human cloning.
Applying moral utility in the illegality context would still face signif-
icant limitations based on precedent and the function of patents. In
Fuller v. Berger, the court recognized that the patent does not confer
the positive right to use the invention, but only the right to exclude. 87
Significantly, the Fuller court recognized that illegality solely concerns
the use of an invention, not the grant or denial of the patent, and that
a user of an illegal invention is "amenable to the municipal authorities
alone for violations of the municipal law.' 188 The concept that the
patent confers no positive right to use or possess the invention, but
merely the right to exclude, continued after passage of the 1952 Act
and subsequent opinions recognize the court's reluctance to imply
lack of patentable utility based on an invention's use.189 Juicy Whip
continued this judicial understanding of utility when it repeated what
185. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
187. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903). The court stated that:
The inventor's right to make, vend, and use his device does not come from the patent
law; it is his natural right. The government's grant to the patentee and his assigns is the
right to exclude others from practicing the invention .... "The franchise which the
patent consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or
vending the thing patented, without permission of the patentee. This is all he obtains
by the patent." [A] law which prohibits the use of a certain article, which is patented, is
not in derogation of the inventor's grant under the patent law .... [The] law operates
wholly upon the inventor's natural right to the use of his property, and not at all upon
the franchise which the patent grants, which consists altogether in the right to exclude.)
Id. (quoting Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 548
(1852), and concluding, "It is equally obvious that, however the court may act upon complain-
ant's asserted right to exclude, neither the grant nor the denial of the writ of injunction would
operate on complainant's practices or habits..
188. Id.
189. See generally Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (describing the right to exclude as the "hallmark of a protected property inter-
est"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (reasoning that the right to ex-
clude was "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property"); Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885,
1886 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (concluding that the inventor had no right to use the invention in states
that outlaw radar detectors, but that limitation did not affect his patent rights).
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the Supreme Court stated in the 1880 decision of Webber v. Virginia,
that "Congress never intended that the patent laws should displace
the police powers of the States ... ."9o If it is only the use of the
invention that is illegal, then the patent cannot be denied for utility on
the basis of that same illegality because the patent merely grants its
owner the limited right to exclude.
Conversely, the Federal Circuit's reliance on Webber might not be
true to the Supreme Court's understanding of utility under the 1952
Act. In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court emphasized the "ben-
efit derived by the public" in its definition of utility.191 To be patenta-
ble, an invention must have "specific" and "substantial utility" which,
by the grant, bestows a "specific benefit" on the public.1 92 Following
an interpretation of this precedent, the USPTO adopted the 2001 Util-
ity Examination Guidelines which use "specific, substantial, and credi-
ble" to define patentable utility. 193 In approving the Guidelines, the
USPTO affirmed that patents confer the right to exclude and denied
their ability to grant title or ownership. 194 According to the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Brenner, the public can derive no benefit from an
invention whose purpose is purely and specifically forbidden by law.
Under Brenner, such an invention might be invalid for lack of utility.
Likewise, under the USPTO guidelines, an invention expressly
banned by federal law might stumble on the hurdles of "specific, sub-
stantial, and credible" utility under the Guidelines. 195
By defining patentable utility as a benefit to the public, the Su-
preme Court seems to take into account other courts' reluctance to
invalidate patents for lack of utility based on the illegality of their use.
To some degree, the USPTO still uses this reluctance to justify the
grant. Based on this narrow interpretation, should Congress enact a
full human cloning ban, it is possible that the Federal Circuit or the
USPTO would invalidate or reject a patent directed to human cloning
based on the illegality aspect of moral utility. However, as illustrated
by the well-received Fuller reasoning, the inherent connection to the
190. See Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1368 (quoting Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1880)); supra note 120 and accompanying text.
191. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
192. Id.
193. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
194. See supra note 138.
195. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1092. Following the "Utility Review
Flowchart" provided with the training materials on the website, a banned invention might pass
muster for a "specific" utility, but would probably fail under an evaluation of "substantial" utility
because an illegal use might be defined as "throw away," which is specifically noted as a basis for
rejection. Id.
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invention's use implied by a denial based on illegality might be incom-
patible with established policies of the American patent system.
B. The USPTO's Reluctance to Apply Moral Utility
As an administrative agency, the USPTO implements federal legis-
lation and interprets judicial opinions relating to its function. 196 The
USPTO must base any grant or denial on established laws and prece-
dent, or face reversal by a court. The USPTO's frustration and reluc-
tance to apply moral utility to the most controversial aspects of
biotechnology illustrates the agency's delicate balancing act between
interpretation and administration. Since the first controversial appli-
cation for a patent directed to human-animal chimeras in 1998, the
USPTO has implemented a patchwork policy that refuses inventions it
considers "encompassing a human being .... ",197 By its own admis-
sion, the USPTO considers its procedure on tenuous legal grounds. 198
To solidify its ability to continue rejecting human cloning patents, the
USPTO has publicly stated its desire for congressional clarification on
the issue in the form of legislation excluding the controversial proce-
dure from patentable subject matter. 199 Until Congress enacts a spe-
cific exclusion, moral utility will likely continue to be one of the
possible bases for rejection of an otherwise valid application directed
to human cloning. The USPTO's reliance on moral utility to deny
protection for these inventions, whether illegal or not, will likely face
sound legal objections in any action brought to challenge such a rejec-
tion. Although the USPTO's reluctance to impart moral judgments
during the examination process might be diminished with a congres-
196. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 1153. Merges and Duffy explain that,
"Unlike the other institutions in the patent system, the USPTO is an administrative agency, not a
court. [One of the main features of the USPTO is that it] has not only legal, but technical
expertise." Id.
197. See Hauda, supra note 154 and accompanying text. The Manual states that:
It is clear from the Supreme Court decision .. .[of Diamond v. Chakrabarty] that the
question of whether or not an invention embraces living matter is irrelevant to the issue
of patentability. The test set down by the Court for patentable subject matter in this
area is whether the living matter is the result of human intervention .... [summarizing
the relevant points of Chakrabarty and concluding:] The Office will decide the ques-
tions as to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 on a case-by-case basis fol-
lowing the tests set forth in Chakrabarty, e.g., that "a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter" is patentable, etc. It is inappropriate to try to
attempt to set forth here in advance the exact parameters to be followed .... If the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a
human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 must be made indicating that the
claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.
Id.




sional ban on human cloning, a complete solution will result only from
the specific exclusion of human cloning from patentable subject
matter.
1. USPTO's Consideration of Moral Utility in Rejections of Human
Cloning Patents
The USPTO does not consider moral utility to be the most logical
reasoning for rejecting patents directed at human cloning. Although
still viable by the Agency's interpretive authority, the USPTO's testi-
mony before the President's Council on Bioethics pointed to glaring
logical errors that might be committed if the agency continued to rely
on the doctrine. 200 Acknowledging a combination of three factors
that the office used to reject patents directed to human cloning, a Su-
pervisory Patent Examiner stated that "the courts have interpreted
the utility requirement to exclude inventions deemed to be injurious
to the well-being, good public policy, or good morals of society. '20 1
Considering the notable absence of congressional guidance excluding
human clones from patentable subject matter under the Human Clon-
ing Prohibition Act of 2003, the USPTO's reluctant recognition of the
doctrine, even in the narrow exception left after Juicy Whip, points to
the possibility of continued, albeit misplaced, application.
Analysis of the specific factors the USPTO uses to reject patents
directed at human cloning reveals that the agency's reasoning runs
afoul of Supreme Court precedent. The USPTO has specifically
stated that, regarding the application of utility to human cloning, the
Office will reject such applications based on three factors: first, the
language of § 101 does not include humans as patentable subject mat-
ter; second, conferring rights over humans may raise constitutional
questions; and third, courts have interpreted § 101 as excluding inven-
tions based on moral grounds.20 2 The USPTO qualified the last factor
in light of Juicy Whip and concluded that grounds for rejection based
on morality are tenuous.203
The first factor that considers the subject matter limitations of § 101
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. In Chakrabarty, the Court
interpreted the meaning of the patentable subject matter provisions of
§ 101.204 Under the 1952 Patent Act, § 101 described patentable sub-
ject matter as a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
200. See Rai, supra note 157 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
203. See Hauda, supra note 154; Rai, supra note 157.
204. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980).
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matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. '205 Upholding a
patent directed to an organism created through genetic manipulation,
the Court stated that § 101 was an embodiment of the statute's legisla-
tive history that broadly defined protection for "anything under the
sun that is made by man. ' 20 6 Furthermore, the Court concluded that,
as a product of human ingenuity, the modified organism in
Chakrabarty was not precluded by the broad language of § 101.207
By analogy, human clones are the result of genetic manipulation
and are necessarily man-made. With respect to patents claiming the
products of human cloning, the USPTO stated that the language of
§ 101 could not include this subject.208 Following the reasoning of
Chakrabarty, which defined patentable subject matter as "anything
under the sun that is made by man," it is logical to conclude that ei-
ther the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit would overrule a
USPTO rejection of a human cloning patent if it were based on the
Agency's misguided formulation of patentable subject matter. The
USPTO's reliance on any perceived limitations in § 101 is likely mis-
placed and could possibly be overruled in the federal courts.
Similarly, the USPTO's statements in response to inquiries concern-
ing the limits of patents granted to the University of Missouri signal
that the Agency's policy regarding patents on human cloning is incon-
sistent with Chakrabarty. Concerned that the patent claiming tech-
niques and products from genetically modified pigs for use as human
organ donors amounted to human cloning, several media sources
pressed the USPTO for comment about the extent of the grant. 20 9 In
response, the USPTO stated that it would not grant patents on
humans "because it had not received any guidance from Congress or
the courts saying it should do so."'210 The Supreme Court rejected
similar USPTO reasoning that, until Congress expressly authorized
patent protection for living organisms, the Office could not expand
patentable subject matter to include the genetically-modified organ-
ism at issue.211 In Chakrabarty, the USPTO refused a patent on a
living organism in part because Congress had not specifically included
protection for living things and the Office should not so greatly ex-
pand patentable subject matter without firm guidance. 212 Relying on
205. Id. at 307.
206. Id. at 309.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
211. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
212. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; see also supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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the legislative history of § 101, the Court rejected the USPTO's rea-
soning and concluded that "[b]road general language is not necessarily
ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms. '213 By
the Court's interpretation of the Patent Act, all endeavors of human
invention are necessarily patentable subject matter.214 Therefore, it is
likely that relevant Supreme Court precedent does not support the
USPTO's current justification for rejecting human cloning patents
based on a lack of congressional guidance. Rejections based on this
justification are likely to fail, as in Chakrabarty.
Regardless of the response to inquiries concerning the University of
Missouri patent, it is important to understand why the grant likely
does not encompass a human being. Two considerations bring serious
doubt to allegations that the patent issued to the University of Mis-
souri actually claimed human cloning. First, the USPTO has specifi-
cally refused to issue patents claiming human cloning.215 The
guidance presented by the USPTO in testimony before the President's
Council on Bioethics outlined the specific steps the examiners take
when considering potential human cloning patents.216 Based in part
on the moral utility doctrine, the USPTO's official conclusion is that
human cloning is not patentable and that the Agency has the interpre-
tive authority to make this decision absent specific guidance from
Congress.217 The USPTO's examination process and the fact that the
USPTO refuses to issue patents directed to human cloning provides
credible authority that the University of Missouri patent does not ac-
tually claim the process or its products.
213. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315; see also supra text accompanying note 90.
214. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. Id. at 309. Chakrabarty explained the
parameters of § 101:
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are
"manifestations of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
Id.
215. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text. Hauda stated:
[O]n June 11th, 1987 the USPTO's Assistant Commissioner testified that a claim, in-
cluding a human being within its scope, will not be considered to be patentable subject
matter. In the 15 years since it was notified of the USPTO's interpretations, Congress
has apparently acquiesced to the USPTO interpretation. Further, the Federal Circuit
held in 1991 that the USPTO has the authority to establish its policy through interpre-
tative authority.
Hauda, supra note 154.
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Second, the examination and prosecution process is only intended
to give a "rough, first cut" answer to the question of validity. 218 After
successful prosecution, a patent is only "presumed valid" and the
courts make the final determination of validity and of the breadth of
the claims in subsequent infringement actions. 219 Therefore, even if
the University of Missouri patent actually claims human cloning, the
validity of that claim is unclear without a subsequent judicial determi-
nation. Based on the express USPTO policy against human cloning
and the mere presumption of validity created by issuance, the conten-
tion that the University of Missouri patent actually claims human
cloning is questionable. 220
Concerning the general application of the USPTO factors, as testi-
mony before the President's Council on Bioethics illustrated, the
Agency will reject an application on a combination of factors and not
solely on the basis of improper subject matter. To the extent that
Juicy Whip weakened the USPTO's ability to consider moral utility as
one of the factors, the Office is not comfortable with maintaining a
rejection on this basis.221 The USPTO acknowledged the implication
of the Federal Circuit's questioning the viability of moral utility in
Juicy Whip that, should the Agency's current policy toward human
cloning patents come before the court, "the resulting outcome, espe-
cially on public policy grounds, ... [would be] ...uncertain. '222
While a federal ban on human cloning might bolster the USPTO's
ability to apply moral utility to rejections on patents directed to that
process, such a prohibition is far from the clear patentable subject
matter guidance the Agency desires.223
218. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 1154; see also supra text accompanying note 7.
219. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002) ("Presumption of validity; defenses: A patent shall be presumed
valid.").
220. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text. One future policy question is whether
the USPTO's responsibilities should be expanded beyond their traditional examination scope.
The agency has limited itself to only revising defective patent though correction and reissue.
With passage of 35 U.S.C §§ 301-307 in 1980, Congress sought to "strengthen... the certainty of
patent rights by establishing a system of administrative reexamination of doubtful patents." See
H.R. REP. No. 96-1307 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6460, 6462. In 1999, Congress
passed 35 U.S.C §§ 311-318, which allowed potential infringers the ability to challenge a patent's
validity through reexamination. This shift might signal an expansion of the USPTO's role, possi-
bly to the eventual conclusion that the agency decides all challenges to validity. For a brief
examination of this possibility, see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 1154.
221. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.




C. Moral Utility as Inconsistent with the Goals of the United States
Patent System
Moral utility cannot stand in harmony with the broad goals of the
United States patent system, whether based on objective considera-
tions of legislative opinion through illegality or on entirely subjective
opinions of judges and patent examiners. As stated in the Constitu-
tion, the patent system exists "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries. '22 4 It was Jefferson's belief
that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement" that drove
America's industrial creativity and progress.225 By granting the right
for a limited time to exclude others from practicing an invention, the
patent provides an important incentive for the inventor and potential
investors to find, support, and exploit innovative technology. Further-
more, the patent system ensures that other inventors and researchers
are aware of the latest technological advances in any given field. Re-
gistration encourages the dissemination of important information to
provide a solid foundation for further advances or a point to begin
new research. Basing an invention's legal protection on societal con-
siderations of morality or legislative determinations of the legality of
its use strips from the scientific community any incentive to find legal
or beneficial uses while at the same time decreasing our possible un-
derstanding of an entire field of innovation.
Precedent concerning the "injurious" prong of the common defini-
tion of moral utility illustrates the benefit of allowing patents directed
to human cloning. 226 In re Anthony and In re Watson concerned ap-
peals from USPTO rejections based on lack of utility. The examiner
found no utility in two FDA-approved pharmaceutical compounds
that, when applied to humans, had the potential for deadly side ef-
fects.22 7 In reversing the USPTO rejection, the court stated that safety
was not a component of patentable utility. 228 Federal agencies, the
court noted, were the proper arbiters of an invention's safety and the
USPTO must concede to those offices any well-meaning intentions to
protect the public.2 29 Most importantly, the court stated that the in-
ventions would be more useful if they were not dangerous, "but the
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8; supra note 25.
225. See 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
226. See In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465 (C.C.P.A.
1975).
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fact remains that they are useful, useful to doctors, veterinarians and
research workers, useful to patients ... and so are useful within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C § 101. ''230
The process of human cloning, at the current stage of research, is
undoubtedly dangerous. Nearly all credible authorities in the biotech-
nology industry recognize that the procedures involved in human
cloning entail great risks.231 However, the patent system does not ex-
ist to shield the public from injurious inventions. As stated in
Anthony and Watson, public safety concerns are specifically reserved
for other federal agencies. 232 In support of the broadest policy goals
of the patent system, to provide incentives for research and innova-
tion, and to disseminate the most credible technical information possi-
ble, even dangerous inventions are patentable. 233  Like the
pharmaceutical compounds at issue in Watson and Anthony, patents
claiming human cloning may be useful to biotechnology scientists and
researchers seeking to advance knowledge and understanding in their
field. Human cloning patents, because they support the purposes of
encouraging innovation and the advancement of knowledge, cannot
be denied due to lack of moral utility.
However, because human cloning may have serious effects on pub-
lic health or other detrimental consequences, allowing such patents
may not promote the broad goals of the patent system. Because of
the extreme dangers made possible by the unfettered exploration of
this technology, rejection of patents claiming human cloning might be
the best solution. Nuclear weapons, for example, were so dangerous
to society that Congress denied all patent protection for such inven-
tions.234 Private innovation in the field of nuclear weapons is not
something that the patent system should encourage, and neither
should information regarding such innovations be widely available
230.. Id.
231. Leon R. Kass, How One Clone Leads to Another, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at A23. Kass
stated:
It is true that cloning research offers hope, however speculative, for understanding and
treating disease. Yet we should not deceive ourselves about the value and necessity of
such research: there is virtually no precedent in animal work that demonstrates the
unique benefits of creating and exploiting cloned embryos; we have only just begun to
understand existing embryonic stem cells; and promising results with adult stem cells, if
confirmed, may obviate altogether the putative need for cloned stem cells ....
Id. The author is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and chairman of the President's
Council on Bioethics.
232. See Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383; Watson, 517 F.2d 465; see also supra note 81 and accompany-
ing text.
233. See cases cited supra note 232.
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000); see also supra notes 96, 122 and accompanying text.
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due to obvious public safety considerations. Human cloning, with its
attendant risks, might be similarly harmful to the public health and
safety. Therefore, human cloning patents, like those for nuclear weap-
ons, should be denied protection.
The exclusion of protection for nuclear weapons, however, does not
originate from any public safety concerns of the USPTO. The ban on
these patents comes from a congressional mandate which specifically
narrowed the scope of patentable subject matter.235 Current legisla-
tion to make human cloning illegal does not include a measure similar
to 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) which denied patent protection for nuclear
weapons. 236 Similarly, the USPTO recognized that the surest tech-
nique to remove human cloning from patent protection would be to
include a measure like § 2181(a) in any temporary or permanent ban
on human cloning.2 37 That no proposed legislation to ban human
cloning includes this exclusion from patentable subject matter signals
that Congress intends to strike a balance between denying the ability
to produce a human clone and promoting the policies of the patent
system by allowing such grants to issue. While a ban on human clon-
ing would undoubtedly stifle the methods cloning researchers could
employ, ensuring patent protection would promote the exploration of
legal methods and guarantee that credible information continued to
be available to find legitimate innovation in this field.
It is important to note that all versions of the proposed human clon-
ing ban include provisions for a Government Accounting Office study
to be conducted after the prohibition becomes law to assess the prohi-
bition's effects.238 Likewise, the final recommendations by the Presi-
dent's Council on Bioethics did not call for a complete ban on the
235. See supra note 234.
236. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 245, 108th
Cong. (2003); supra note 172 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
238. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534. The Act states:
The General Accounting Office after consultation with the National Academy of Sci-
ences shall conduct a study to assess the need (if any) for amendment of the prohibition
on human cloning... which study should include: 1) a discussion of new developments
in medical technology concerning human cloning and somatic cell nuclear transfer, the
need (if any) for somatic cell nuclear transfer to produce medical advances, current
public attitudes and prevailing ethical views concerning the use of somatic cell nuclear
transfer, and potential legal implications of research in somatic cell nuclear transfer;
and 2) a review of any technological developments that may require that technical
changes be made to ... this Act.
Id.; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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procedure, but rather, a moratorium. 239 Although both the legislative
and executive branches understand the risks of the procedure, they
recognize the potential benefits it might produce under a monitored
regime. Granting patents to inventors exploring legal and ethical ap-
plications of human cloning even under a federal ban of the proce-
dure, would "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts"
and minimize the moral considerations of this technology. 240
IV. IMPAcT
The USPTO will likely continue to apply moral utility to deny
human cloning patents. However, rejections based on moral utility
will face significant challenges in the federal courts and the USPTO
may be forced to abandon its current procedure. The Juicy Whip deci-
sion seemed to close all but one door on the application of moral util-
ity in patent law. Given the Federal Circuit's reluctance to freely
recognize moral utility and the Supreme Court's broad understanding
of utility and patentable subject matter, it is doubtful that any rejec-
tion based on the doctrine could survive judicial scrutiny. Although it
remains to be seen how a higher court might view such a rejection
should the human cloning ban become federal law, such a determina-
tion seems misaligned with the patent system's incentive and dissemi-
nation of information goals. Despite the current presence of the
doctrine during the USPTO examination process, moral utility, as il-
lustrated by the Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip, seems ill-suited to a
system that depends on certainty and objectivity. The practice of re-
jecting a patent based on personal or societal determinations of mo-
rality, at least as applied to mechanical inventions, was abandoned
long ago and such abandonment will continue in light of Juicy
Whip.241 Allowing moral utility only in the context of an invention's
239. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETH-
ICAL INQUIRY (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/index.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003). The report stated that
[a] moratorium, rather than a lasting ban, signals a high regard for the value of bi-
omedical research and an enduring concern for patients and families whose suffering
such research may help alleviate .... [A moratorium] would reaffirm the principle that
science can progress while upholding the community's moral norms.
Id.
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
241. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (explaining patentable utility under the 1952
Patent Act as those inventions having "specific" and "substantial utility" which, by the patent
grant, bestow a "specific benefit" on the public): Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903)
(reversing a lower court's determination that a patent directed to a device with both legal and
illegal uses was invalid); Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang. 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (limiting the
application of moral utility as applied to mechanical devices). Ex pane Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q.
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illegality still presents significant issues, even though such a rejection
would arguably be based on objective factors.
To fulfill the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of sci-
ence, Congress directs the USPTO to grant patents satisfying a limited
set of requirements, among them, that the invention be useful. The
rules developed by the USPTO to evaluate applications based on its
limited interpretive capacity under the Patent Act and judicial prece-
dent must be based on objective factors. To allow courts and the
USPTO to apply subjective ideas of morality will undoubtedly in-
crease uncertainty in application of patent law and stifle innovation
and progress in the field of genetic research.
Allowing moral utility to continue as a requirement for patentabil-
ity may increase uncertainty within the patent system. The narrow
exception not yet addressed by the Federal Circuit that possibly re-
mains after Juicy Whip would reject or invalidate a patent on the basis
of moral utility in the illegality context. Forcing courts to evaluate an
invention's patentability based on the legality or illegality of its use
would inject a hurdle to protection seemingly without basis in the Pat-
ent Act. Requiring an evaluation of the invention's legality would in-
crease uncertainty first, because courts are not equipped to decide
issues of patentability from within the context of legislation that
originates in the criminal code and second, because an invention may
have many uses, legal or not, that the inventor never envisioned.
A court facing an appeal of a rejection based on moral utility's ille-
gality prong would be forced to evaluate patentability based on an act
prohibited by the criminal code that may or may not be facilitated by
the information contained in the application. The court would have to
evaluate the invention's utility based on the likelihood that it would
be used to commit a criminal act. Clearly, courts are well-equipped to
evaluate the legality of human actions against legislation that criminal-
izes acts. However, a court evaluating patentable utility by its under-
standing of an act prohibited under the criminal code would be forced
to do so prospectively. The mere fact that the inventor submitted an
application for patent protection does not mean that a criminal act has
been committed. Although a human cloning patent may claim a pro-
cess that facilitates a prohibited act, and under a cloning ban no one
could practice the specific invention, any determination that the in-
vention lacks utility would be made from the court's understanding
that the only use for the claimed invention would be illegal. To gain
(BNA) 801 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1977) (declaring gambling devices to be ineligible
for analysis under subjective determinations of morality).
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this understanding, the court would necessarily have to make subjec-
tive determinations concerning the invention's utility based on objec-
tive factors derived from a criminal statute. Basing patentable utility
on standards bearing no relation or reference to the Patent Act would
reduce judicial reasoning to the same level observed in early cases
rejecting gambling devices. 242 Subjective determinations based on an
invention's possible illegal use would leave inventors with little notice
of their discovery's validity.
Furthermore, continued application of moral utility to deny patents
directed to human cloning will paralyze certain aspects of the United
States biotechnology industry. Although not considered credible or
even possible given the field's current state of knowledge, some scien-
tists have predicted that an absolutely perfect process might cure in-
fertility as well as other maladies with a basis in genetics. 243 By
removing the ability to protect innovation in this field based on the
tenuous application of a legal antique, the USPTO or the courts will
do little justice to a system that is the basis for the United States'
strength in numerous industrial endeavors. Growth in any technologi-
cal field requires patents. Moral utility's application to human cloning
will only subdue or eradicate the hope of worthwhile advances in this
field.
V. CONCLUSION
Monsters should not be roaming the halls of the USPTO or the fed-
eral courts. The simple charge to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts . . ." should not be sacrificed for the imposition of
subjective moral determinations or on the basis of laws originating in
the criminal code. 244 The idea that to maintain the United States'
growth in biotechnology, the patent system should support Jefferson's
philosophy that "ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement"
even if that innovation has the potential to harm, seems repugnant to
some members of society, or is actually illegal.245 Moral utility's slight
justification in the wake of Juicy Whip seems to be a potential basis
for the doctrine's future use, but any further application would be
reckless and unsound.
Should the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003 become law,
the USPTO and the courts would seem to have an objective basis for
moral utility's fresh application. However, the prohibition identified
242. See, e.g., Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897).
243. See Kass, supra note 231.
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
245. 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at 76.
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in the proposed law concerns actions having no relevance to the pat-
ent system. The proscription of acts central to any criminal code can-
not be applied in the context of patentable utility because the patent
does not confer any positive right to use or possess the invention
claimed. The user of an illegal invention is "amenable to the munici-
pal authorities alone for violations of the municipal law" and the Pat-
ent Act cannot further or enforce criminal provisions. 246
Likewise, current USPTO procedures employing moral utility in the
context of human cloning should be abandoned in favor of either Con-
gress's specific removal of the procedure from patentable subject mat-
ter or a revision of the agency's examination methods. By relying on
moral utility as one of the factors for rejecting these patents, the
USPTO continues to make subjective determinations of morality no
different than the unfounded rejections of gambling patents at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century.247 Furthermore, basing rejections on
the absence of congressional guidance concerning genetically-modi-
fied humans as patentable subject matter runs afoul of direct Supreme
Court precedent. The USPTO cannot continue to reject human clon-
ing patents based on its current policy without facing almost certain
derision in the federal courts.
The patent system exists to protect ideas, not people. Likewise, the
system serves the progress of science and the encouragement of inno-
vation, not the criminal code. Moral utility promotes a vision of the
patent as a comprehensive property right and not the limited right to
exclude, recognized by almost all interpretations of the Patent Act.
Continued recognition of the doctrine will only stifle the quest for
knowledge and understanding of human cloning and limit innovation
in a burgeoning area of technology. Admittedly, the current under-
standing of human cloning could wreak havoc on genetic diversity and
cause incomprehensible damage. 248  However, the technology could
also reveal considerable benefits.249 Whatever the potential for the
246. See Fuller, 120 F. at 274.
247. See, e.g., Schultze, 82 F. at 449.
248. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Votes to Ban All Human Cloning, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2003,
at A22. During debate before passage of H.R. 534, the author of the bill, Representative Dan
Weldon
held up a white loose-leaf binder on the House floor, saying he had reviewed 88 medi-
cal studies and could not find a single one showing cloning's potential. "We're talking
about scientists" creating human embryos for the purpose of exploiting them and de-
stroying them . . . [t]here is no scientific evidence today that this is justifiable.
Id.
249. Id. Stolberg stated:
The National Academy of Sciences has concluded that cloning does hold scientific
promise, and 40 Nobel laureates have expressed support for the work. If there is a
[Vol. 53:159
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technology, rejecting these patents based on moral utility could only
serve as an economic disincentive and suppress the spread of credible
knowledge. The real danger will not come from publishing these ideas
or providing incentives for further exploration, but from suppressing
or ignoring them. If the patent system truly exists to promote the pro-
gress of science, then it must exorcise this monster called moral utility.
Andrew R. Smith*
dearth of scientific evidence, proponents of [cloning] research say, it is only because
cloning is in its infancy, and because there is such political controversy around it that
most researchers are loath to try the experiments. "Extreme conviction seems to be
crowding out understanding here today," said Representative Rush D. Holt, a New
Jersey Democrat who has a Ph.D in physics. "These researchers are not crazed Dr.
Frankensteins. They are people like your neighbors, highly ethical, who are working
hard to relieve suffering, to improve quality of life. Let's not make them criminals."
Id. (referring to NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, COMM. ON ScI., ENG'G, AND PUB. POL'Y, BD. OF
LIFE SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING
(2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076374/html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003); State-
ment by 40 Nobel Laureates Regarding Cloning, The American Society for Cell Biology availa-
ble at http://www.ascb.org/publicpolicy/Nobelletter.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
* I would like to express my deepest appreciation, gratitude, and love to my wife, Shannon.
for her extraordinary understanding and inspiration. Also, I would like to thank Assistant Pro-
fessor Katherine Strandburg and the DePaul Law Review Editorial Board for their assistance in
the revision and publication of this work.
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